中國經濟

Chinese property is beyond repair. How can creditors delay its collapse?

Patch up the roof, ignore the foundations, feed the hedgies

In 2022 we were describing China’s property crash as “a slow-motion financial crisis”. In retrospect it wasn’t all that slow-motion. The chart below is from Barclays’ 2024 Credit Outlook:

More than half of China’s top developers followed Evergrande into default after Beijing moved in 2020 to restrict new borrowing, unravelling a funding model that was built on dollar-denominated high-yield debt and bankrolled by local government financing vehicles.

Since the beginning of 2020, at least 60 China property issuers with more than $140bn in outstanding dollar bonds have defaulted, Barclays calculates:

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