觀點貝兒斯登

LESSONS FROM THE COLLAPSE OF BEAR STEARNS

Two years ago yesterday, Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson called up Alan Schwartz, the chief executive of Bear Stearns, and told him the jig was up. “Alan, you're in the government's hands now,” he said. “Bankruptcy is the only other option.” Thus began the epic stage of the credit crunch and 24 months on, many costly lessons have been learned.

● Leverage kills. In March 2008, Bear had tangible equity capital of about $11bn supporting total assets of $395bn - a leverage ratio of 36. For several years, this reckless financing enabled the company to achieve a profit margin of about a third and a return on equity of 20 per cent; when the market turned, it left Bear bereft of capital and willing creditors. During the ensuing months, the same story was to be played out at scores of other banks and non-banks.

Last year, the group of 20 leading economies agreed to impose higher capital ratios. So far, no figures have been published. Officially, the gnomes of Basel – the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision – are at work. Unofficially, Tim Geithner, the US Treasury secretary, has a maximum leverage ratio in mind. What that figure turns out to be will indicate how serious the authorities are about preventing future blow-ups.

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