Every 10 years or so, it seems, another industry is nominated to be the new primary combat theatre for trade wars involving China. (This is distinct from eternal wars of attrition such as the steel sector.) In the 2000s, it was clothes and shoes. In the 2010s, it was solar panels. The 2020s looked set to be the decade of wrangling over semiconductors, but electric vehicles are, as it were, coming up fast on the outside.
Two weeks ago, the EU broke into the open and threatened anti-subsidy duties on imports of EVs from China. European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen warned against repeating the experience of solar cells, where Chinese producers overtook an early European lead to dominate the EU and indeed the global market.
But the EU’s problem with EVs has not primarily been a naive opening of the European market. These poorly targeted and possibly counterproductive trade restrictions, which risk holding back the green transition by making EVs more expensive, are not a substitute for creating an environment in which European companies can compete.