Conventional economic thinking tells us that people go where the jobs are. In America, there is a long history of westward expansion in search of opportunity. In the UK, Margaret Thatcher’s employment secretary, Norman Tebbit, was fond of telling people about his father who, when unemployed, “got on his bike and looked for work, and he kept looking till he found it.” Clearly, it is easier to find work when you are mobile. But what happens when people can’t or won’t move to where the jobs are?
It is a question that American policymakers are focusing on in the wake of pandemic related job destruction. Covid-19 hit different groups of people in very different ways, with virtual knowledge workers doing far better than those in professions that require face-to-face contact. Statistics pointing to declining income inequality during the pandemic are misleading, say some academics, because they reflect short-term government policy responses, such as handing out stimulus cheques. Longer term, it’s quite clear that the nature of work is going to shift radically, with the possibility of many more jobs being done anywhere — be it Bangalore or Bangor.
This may open up a new globalisation of white collar labour markets, which could benefit workers in emerging markets that are moving ahead digitally, but could also put pressure on labour in richer countries. On the other hand, American workers unable to afford housing, childcare and schooling in expensive coastal cities could move to one of the less expensive “zoomtowns” that have grown during the pandemic.
