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The perils of America’s chips strategy
美國晶片戰略的風險

Progress has been made at home, but what comes next abroad will make a big difference
國內已經取得了進展,但接下來在國外發生的事情將產生重大影響。

Looking back over the Biden administration, the passage of the bipartisan Chips and Science Act should fall near the top of any list of its accomplishments. It has been obvious for a long time that not only the US, but also the world, needed a more diverse group of production hubs for semiconductors — the lifeblood of the digital economy. Until quite recently, most chips were made in south-east Asia and nearly all high-end ones were made in Taiwan, arguably the third most geopolitically contentious place in the world after Ukraine and the Middle East.

回顧拜登政府的執政歷程,兩黨共同通過的《晶片與科學法》應該位居其成就清單的前列。長期以來,顯而易見的是,不僅美國,而且全世界都需要一個更加多樣化的半導體生產中心,而半導體正是數字經濟的命脈。直到最近,大多數晶片都是在東南亞生產的,幾乎所有的高階晶片都是在臺灣生產的,臺灣可以說是繼烏克蘭和中東之後世界上地緣政治爭議第三大的地方。

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