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Lessons from the great reflation

There is a danger not just of loosening too soon but of loosening too far

What can we learn from monetarists about what happened to prices after the Covid-19 pandemic struck? What can we learn from the mistakes made in the 1970s? The purpose of posing these questions is to inject humility into current debates, especially among central bankers. Their failure to forecast, or prevent, the big jumps in price levels of recent years is significant. So, why did it happen and what might history suggest about the mistakes still to come?

It is possible to argue that there is nothing to learn. Covid-19 was, it might be suggested, a unique event to which policymakers responded in the most sensible possible way. Similarly, the 1970s are ancient history. Our policymakers would not make the mistake of letting inflation shoot up again, so embedding expectations of permanently high inflation. I would like to believe these propositions. But I do not.

Start with money. There have been two obstacles to taking the money supply seriously. The more important is that it was discarded as a target and even an indicator by “respectable” macroeconomists long ago. The less important was the hysteria of so many about the quantitative easing introduced after the global financial crisis. This obscured what was so very different this time.

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馬丁•沃爾夫

馬丁•沃爾夫(Martin Wolf) 是英國《金融時報》副主編及首席經濟評論員。爲嘉獎他對財經新聞作出的傑出貢獻,沃爾夫於2000年榮獲大英帝國勳爵位勳章(CBE)。他是牛津大學納菲爾德學院客座研究員,並被授予劍橋大學聖體學院和牛津經濟政策研究院(Oxonia)院士,同時也是諾丁漢大學特約教授。自1999年和2006年以來,他分別擔任達佛斯(Davos)每年一度「世界經濟論壇」的特邀評委成員和國際傳媒委員會的成員。2006年7月他榮獲諾丁漢大學文學博士;在同年12月他又榮獲倫敦政治經濟學院科學(經濟)博士榮譽教授的稱號。

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